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DISCIPLINING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: FIRST AMENDMENT
DECADENCE IN SOUTHWORTH AND BOY
SCOUTS OF AMERICA AND EUROPEAN
ALTERNATIVES
Larry Cata Backer*
American constitutional jurisprudence has entered a period of decadence.
The characteristics of this decadence is much in evidence in the constitutional
jurisprudence of the American Supreme Court: judicial arbitrariness, the use of
interpretive doctrine as an end rather than a means, disregard of existing
interpretive doctrine and hyper-distinction of fact, doctrine as a smokescreen for
personal preference, and an inclination to permit the juridification of everyday
life. Indeed, these characteristics of decadence are made worse by a bloated and
ill-defined catalogue of interpretive doctrine that veils all distortion of
constitutional principle in the service of personal politics. Here is a
jurisprudence in decline, increasingly noted more for arbitrariness than principle
In this context, it is worth inquiring whether there might be a suggestion for
improvement in the juristic traditions of European or supra-national
constitutional systems. This article examines the latest example of the modern
phenomenon of jurisprudential decline through an analysis of two First
Amendment cases decided during the American Supreme Court's 1999-2000
Term. It then looks to the French and German systems of constitutional review,
and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, to determine
whether other systems provide translatable lessons for a more effective and
democratically based supervision of the interpretive function of the American
Supreme Court. It suggests that while European traditions of hierarchies of
fundamental constitutional values provide at least a basis for the policing of
judicial interpretation. In the absence of regularization and restraint the
American system constitutional jurisprudence (like any other system relying on
judicial interpretation) will collapse of its own weight. Equally likely, is the
* Executive Director, Comparative & International Law Center and Professor of Law, University
of Tulsa College of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Penn. State University, Dickinson School of Law.
My thanks to Prof. Robert Gatter (Penn. State) and Prof. Oleksandr Merezhko (Kiev) for their
comments on earlier drafts, and especially to Donna Backer for reminding me of the dangers of
believing, like the British did a century ago, that there is any peculiar significance to the fact that the
sun rises and sets on any empire, even that of law.
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possibility that such a system will be abandoned because, having become so
engorged in detail, point and counterpoint, thrust and counter-thrust, rule and
exception, it will prove useless to all but the theoretician and the pedant.
Students of comparative law are sometimes warned that it is dangerous to
make comparisons of the approach taken by different legal systems with respect to
the identification and protection of fundamental rights This is especially the case
where human rights are concerned. People from Western democratic states are
sometimes lectured that such an enterprise is basically impossible, given the
differences in the systems that give rise to such rights.2 At the same time,
however, nations that are struggling to overcome histories of violent and
systematic abuses of even the most rudimentary understandings of concomitants of
basic human dignity,3 have taken steps to institutionalize a comparative basis for
1. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 150 (1993):
Our aim is to explain why the case law from the other side of the Atlantic should not be seen
as offering solutions to the interpretation of the convention's [European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] application to the private sphere.
The appropriateness and reasons for the evolution of this case law in its home ground is only
covered superficially. Paradoxically, the comparative exercise has been embarked on in
order to counsel against making such comparisons.
Yet, it should be understood that warnings of these types are not meant to steer us away from the
project of comparison so much as from easy transpositions based on facile conclusions to be drawn by
looking at different systems. Comparison can as easily highlight seemingly unbridgeable difference as
it can highlight a model worthy of emulation. For a defense of the comparative method in rights
discourse, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991).
2. For a well known example, see, eg, Adamantia Pollis and Peter Scwab, Human Rights: A
Western Construct With Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, eds. 1979). Lately, this line of argument has been
adopted by certain organs of modem institutional political Islam, the Chinese state, and their
apologists. For discussion, see, e.g., M.H.A. Reisman, Some Reflections on Human Rights and Clerical
Claims to Political Power, 19 YALEJ. INT'L L 509 (1994); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islamic Human Rights:
A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. INT'L L. J. 307 (1994); James Paul, Islam
and the State: The Problem of Establishing Legitimacy and Human Rights, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1057
(1991); Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim, Qu'ran, Shar'ia and Human Rights: Foundations, Deficiencies,
Prospects, in THE ETHICS OF WORLD RELIGIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (Koung Moltmann, ed.,
1990); MAHATHIR MOHAMMAD & SHINTARO ISHIHARA, THE VOICE OF ASIA: Two LEADERS
DIscUss THE COMING CENTURY 80 (Frank Baldwin, trans. 1995).; Mab Huang, Human Rights in a
Revolutionary Society: The Case of the People's Republic of China, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECrIVES 60 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, eds. 1979). One has to
wonder, however, about such attacks from systems notorious for racism (the revival of African slavery
and genocide), see, e.g., Bernard K. Freamon, Slavery Freedom and the Doctrine of Consensus in
Islamic Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. LJ. 1, 5-6 (1998). and religious bigotry. See, e.g., GILLES
KEPEL, THE PROPHET AND PHAROAH: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN EGYPT (1985); Natan Lerner,
Proselytism, Change of Religion, and International Human Rights, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 477 (1998).
3. Human dignity itself, has been an object of constitutional pronouncement and protection.
Human dignity plays a considerable grounding role, for example, in the German Federal Constitution,
the Grundgesetz.
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state
authority.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as
the basis of every community, of peace, and of justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as
directly enforceable law.
Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 1 (F.R.G.), translated in Donald P. Kommers, THE
[Vol. 36:117
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the recognition and interpretation of human rights in their domestic law.4
Moreover, American scholars have begun to accept "comparative
constitutionalism" as a legitimate basis of study. 5 Its purpose is no longer merely
to serve isolationism and affirm uniqueness and superiority. Rather, the
comparative method now serves also as a means to foster an active or passive
convergence.6 "Borrowing from another system is the most common form of legal
CONSTITUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 507 (2d ed. 1997). For
a discussion of the German Basic Law, see, Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law: A Fifty Year
Assessment, 53 SMU L. REv. 477 (2000).
4. The Republic of South Africa and the Argentine Republic are two cases in point. For a
discussion of the constitutionalization of a comparative/supra-national approach to basic rights within
domestic law in Argentina, see, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in
Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 281 (1999); Jonathon M. Miller, The
Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S. Constitutional Practice as Authority in Nineteenth
Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1483 (1997). For South
Africa, see, e.g., S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 § 36(1) (1996); Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BUTTERWORTH'S
CONST. L. R. 658 (CC); Ferreira v. Levin, 1995 (4) BCLR 437 (W). For commentary, see, e.g., Jeremy
Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa's Bill of Rights and
Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176 (1998); Hoyt Webb, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 205 (1998); Johan D. Van der Vyver, Comparative Constitutionalism: Constitutional
Options for Post-Apartheid South Africa, 40 EMORY L.J. 745, 823 (1991).
5. For recent examples of publications in this area, which includes casebooks suitable for American
law students, see, e.g., G. HARUrYUNYAN & A. MAVCIC, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MODERN WORLD: A COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1999);
VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999); and Mark V.
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999); Johan D.
Van der Vyver, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: Comparative Constitutionalism: Constitutional
Options for Post-Apartheid South Africa 40 EMORY L.J. 745 (1991).
An International Association of Constitutional Law has now gained some prominence for itself in the
United States.
The IACL is the principal organization that promotes constitutionalism worldwide through
scholarly exchanges and contacts. At its fifth quadrennial World Congress, held in
Rotterdam in 1999, 450 participants from more than 50 countries discussed a broad range of
issues of common concern. Until 1996, the United States, unlike almost all other countries
active in the IACL, lacked a national association that would serve as a focal point of activity.
Norman Dorsen, Symposium: a Roundtable on Constitutionalism, Constitutional Rights & Changing
Civil Society: Foreword, 21 CARDOzO L. REv. 1041,1042 (2000).
6. "From at least the time of Cicero, differences between legal systems have been regarded as
inconveniences which have to be overcome." PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING
WORLD 481 (2d ed. 1999). Convergence theory posits that as systems achieve greater awareness of
each other, they will tend to converge through active and passive processes of borrowing,
harmonization, unification, and resemblance based on a convergence of social and economic systems.
See id at 490-92. De Cruz identifies four philosophies of convergence: (i) a jus commune theory
suggesting a reversion to a common law of (at least) the western world, based perhaps on the reception
of a dominant legal culture (possibly that of the U.S.); (ii) a legal evolution theory based on the idea
that legal change is a natural process that will lead to unity at some point with the less developed
systems catching up with the more mature ones; (ii) a natural law theory based on the idea that
because all human being are basically alike, humans as groups will tend eventually to create a singular
form of the "best" system available for human organization and regulation; and (iv) a Marxist thesis
that law, as a mere superstructure of economic control, will tend to converge within similar systems of
economic regulation. See id. at 485-88.
As a practical matter, German comparativists remind us that:
[t]he scholarly pursuit of comparative law has several significant functions. This emerges
from a very simple consideration, that no study deserves the name of a science if it limits
itself to phenomena arising within its national boundaries. For a long time lawyers were
content to be insular in this sense, and to some extent they are so still. But such a position is
untenable, and comparative law offers the only way by which law can become international
2000]
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change.",7 For my purposes in this paper, comparison denotes "both the process or
method of comparing laws and legal systems and the body of insights and
knowledge acquired through that process."8
The comparative method is especially useful at times when an insular system
loses touch with its normative foundation and seems incapable of drawing on its
own capital to renew itself. The American system of constitutionalism - byzantine
and baroque9 - is falling into a senescent decadence that increasingly renders
irrelevant its interpretations of our fundamental rights in the United States.'0 The
interpretive dialogue generated in this fashion by the Supreme Court is self-
referentially powerful; it builds on itself in tighter and tighter circles, generating
greater and greater force on smaller and smaller events.1 And in this way it also
binds its audience into its interpretive world: however much we try, we can't
extricate ourselves from this dialogue, at once powerful in its implications ('we
create meaning') and useless ('we cannot make sense of the meanings we create;
they do not fit').' 2  We stand before the constitutional jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court as Jesus is said to have stood before the Pharisees.13 Many within
the academy and bar stand with the Supreme Court; lawyers are Pharisees by
and consequently a science.
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (3d. Rev. ed., Tony
Weir, trans. 1998) (For a discussion of the comparative method generally, see id. at 32-47).
7. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CHANGE 73 (1991).
8. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, PETER E. HERZOG, EDWARD M. WISE,
COMPARATIVE LAW 2,2 n.2 (6th ed. 1998).
9. It is difficult to dismiss modem observations of the excessively tangled and labyrinthine nature
of moderh constitutional adjudication. Indeed, the First Amendment has provided fodder for this
view. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, The Incarnate Word, That Old Rugged Cross and the State: On the
Supreme Court's October 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic
Absurdity as Jurisprudence, 31 TULSA L.J. 447 (1996).
10. This is indeed a growing area of legal scholarship. This scholarship is grounded on the notion
that courts, and primarily federal courts, do not have exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution.
See, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a
New Agenda for Research, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 63 (1999). For a sampling of the recent literature
questioning the judicial role in constitutional interpretation and advocating a greater role for the
political process, see, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNEr, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICr (1992); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999);
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNrrY OF LEGISLATION (1999); DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE
JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES (1998); Charles Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS,
ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); MARTHA MINOW,
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1999).
11. Perhaps this is the consequence of the court fulfilling its role as the supreme common law court
of the land. Yet, this result is both sad and ironic, for it is hardly the inevitable result of the system we
have created. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997). A growing literature exists on law as a self-referential system. See, e.g.,
AUTOPOIETIC LAW (Gunther Teubner, ed., 1988) (collected essays); AUTOPOIESIS, COMMUNICATION
AND SOCmTY (Benseler et al., eds. 1980)); L'AUTO-ORGANISATION. DE LA PHYSIQUE Au POLITIQUE
(Dumouchel and Dupuy, eds. 1983).
12. See Larry Catd Backer, The Incarnate Word, That Old Rugged Cross and the State: On the
Supreme Court's October 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic
Absurdity as Jurisprudence, 31 TULSA LJ. 447,449 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Matthew 15:1-9 (New International) ("Thus you nullify the word of God for your
tradition"); Id. at 23:1-36 ("The teachers of the law and the Pharisees sit in Moses' seat. So you must
obey them and do everything they tell you. But do not do what they do, for they do not practice what
they preach"). Id. at 23:2-3.
[Vol. 36:117
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nature. I find it troubling to stand in that august company, a company whose
routinized predilections are ultimately destructive of our system. Taking the
teachings of the culturally archetypal encounters between Jesus and the Pharisees
to heart, I prefer to believe that there ought to be a way out from under the
oppressive weight of interpretive Pharisaic folly before the system is swept out
from under us.
Two decisions of the Supreme Court, issued at the close of the last term -
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,14 and Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth'5 - provide a stunning illustration of the decadent
and baroque qualities of constitutional adjudication that is slowly sapping the
vigor of juridical authority to interpret our "Basic Law." Each is an expression of
the overripe over-conceptualization of the interstices of constitutional law.
Protections of the right of "expression" and of "association" lie buried under
multiple layers of doctrine now critical to the core expression of the "right," but
16only related to that core expression by six degrees of separation. Expression and
association become lost in "expressive association," "public accommodation,"
"public forum" and other subsidiary standards, tests and doctrines. Doctrine and
its twists and turns - the periphery - becomes the core about which the central right
is focused.
Perhaps decadence of this type is inevitable. 7 A method of testing this
conclusion requires us to look at the way different, if related, systems approach the
interpretation of similarly expressed notions of basic law. For that purpose I will
briefly examine the interpretive framework within which the German Federal
Constitutional Court, 8 the French system of limited political constitutional
review, 9 and the European Court of Human Rights ° approach the protection of
14. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
15. 120 S. CL 1346 (2000).
16. Cf. JOHN GUARE, Six DEGREES OF SEPARATION (1990) (A play based on the real life
experience of several prominent New York families who took in a person pretending to be the son of
Sidney Poitier and the friend of their children, and who used the entree to take money and other things
from them - each family in part based their decision to allow the man into their house because of the
prominence of the person's feigned connection, and because he had already been let into someone
else's house; he relied on a web of trust and silence). For the litigation surrounding the play see
Hampton v. Guare, 20 MEDIA L. REP. 1160 (NY Sup. Ct. 1992). Thus, separation becomes at once
meaningful (we are all related), meaningless (we are all related), and menacing (we are all related).
Ultimately the focus is on the web rather than the source. Cf Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal
Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURwiETRics J. 291 (1999) (on the meaning and effect of
conceptual distance, id. at 310-13; and the menace of legal evolution, id., at 313-15).
17. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1349 (1982).
18. The German Federal Constitutional Court has been given jurisdiction to decide disputes relating
to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. See GG, art. 93, translated in DONALD P.
KOMMERS, THE CONSTIrUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY app.
A at 516 (2d ed. 1997). For a discussion of the German Constitutional Court, see, e.g., SABINE
MICHALOWSKI AND LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PROTECTION OF CIvIL
LIBERTIES 7-50 (1999).
19. For a discussion, see, e.g,, Lauent Habib, Le Conseil Constitutionel, in SUPRANATIONAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN EUROPE: FUNCTIONS AND SOURCES 215 (Igor I. Kavass, ed. 1992).
20. The European Human Rights Convention is a treaty-based, divided power system created
for the specific purpose of assuring the protection of basic human rights within its signatory
2000]
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fundamental rights such as "expression" and "association." The French system
provides for little judicial interference in matters of constitutional interpretation.2 1
The German system has created a specialized court for the interpretation of the
German Basic Law, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [the "European Convention"] creates a
regional human rights association in which a judicial organ is vested with supreme
interpretive authority.22
Even a brief comparative review of the interpretive practices of the
American Supreme Court, and some of its European analogues, suggests that the
American Court exercises a freedom without restraint to an extent unknown in
Europe. This freedom to devise and abandon interpretive doctrines sets the stage
for a byzantine and ultimately decadent jurisprudence, increasingly unintelligible
to, and remote from, the individuals who are the objects of this jurisprudence. At
the same time, the European approach suggests that even a stricter control of
interpretive principles within the black letter of the fundamental law will only
reduce, and not eliminate, the power of the judiciary to reshape the law to suit it or
the times. Avoidance comes only with abandonment of the judiciary as the focus
of constitutional interpretation. The French have been teaching us this lesson; the
British to a certain extent as well. But with abandonment must come an absolute
faith in the power of the people speaking through their legislative organs. Such
faith is hard to come by after the events of the twentieth century in "freedom-
loving" Europe and the United States.23
I. DECADENCE AND THE AMERICAN CASES.
Boy Scouts of America and Southworth are landmarks of First Amendment
decline. In this section I will examine each for the purpose of highlighting the
states, members of the council of Europe. Under its terms, authoritative supervision is
imposed by an international Commission and Court (the European Commission and the
European Court of Human Rights) upon the legislative, executive, administrative and
judicial authorities of the States Parties.
HoWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 1, 1-2 (1996).
21. The idea of Parliamentary Supremacy is not unknown in the English-speaking world. The
British courts, in particular, had for many years applied the principle of Parliamentary supremacy as a
limiting principle on their power to overturn acts of Parliament. The British courts, however, were free
to interpret such acts. Since Britain joined the European Union, however, even that limitation on the
power of courts has been removed and now, at least with respect to Parliamentary acts which
contravene Britain's obligations under the Treaties defining Britain's member ship in the European
Union. For a discussion of Parliamentary supremacy and the British courts' new obligations within the
context of the European Union, see, e.g., Michael H. Lee, Revolution, Evolution, Devolution:
Confusion, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 465 (2000); Ran Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony:
Understanding Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, 36
STAN. J. INT'L L. 73 (2000); Michael Principe, The Demise of Parliamentary Supremacy? Canadian and
American Influences Upon the New Zealand Judiciary's Interpretations of the Bill of Rights Act of 1993,
16 LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167 (1993).
22. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
Council of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. (Entered into force September 3, 1953).
23. Cf. Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy's
Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998) (On the use of instruments of the democratic order
to subvert the democratic system, using the example of Vichy France).
[Vol. 36:117
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peculiar character of the cases. I do not mean to provide another analysis of the
"meaning" of the cases, their placement within the constellation of First
Amendment "expression," "state subsidy" or "association" cases.24  I will not
explore the usefulness of the cases for application in like contexts by clever
lawyers seeking to advance the political objectives of their paying clients through a
principled manipulation of law. That project, while unavoidable, provides more
grist for the decadence mill.2 Nor will I lament or celebrate the practices, policies,
or extra-governmental social behaviors made more or less difficult by the cases.
Those consequences, no doubt, will be discussed at length, especially by those
who believe that a direct relationship exists between judicial pronouncement
(deemed active) and its object - passive social action.26 Instead, my analysis
concentrates on the "weight" of these cases, a weight that squashes doctrine into
something socially useless, and politically dangerous.
In Southworth, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that a state
university can compel its students, through the imposition of a mandatory student
activity fee, to indirectly fund speech with which they do not agree, but that
permitting students to select specific organizations for funding might violate the
fundamental rights of the complaining students.27 In Boy Scouts of America, a
more divided Court held "that the First Amendment prohibits the State from
imposing such a requirement [that the Boy Scouts of America retain an "avowed
homosexual" as an assistant scoutmaster] through the application of its public
accommodations law."2
To get to these results, the Court, in each instance, was obliged first to
wallow through the swamp of its First Amendment jurisprudence and then to
contort the facts presented to fit the "law." 29 In Southworth, the Supreme Court
24. A number of such works appeared in anticipation of the result in these cases. Many more are
sure to come. For a critique of this enterprise, see, e.g., Richard Posner, Against Constitutional Theory,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Stephen M. Griffin, What is Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and
the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 493 (1989).
25. As such, these are both necessary and worthwhile projects - in terms of the political economy of
law, and its practice in the United States. Extended hyper-discussion of the value of the cases are also
critical within the interior communication of self-contained systems, the outward expressions of which
are the cases themselves.
26. As such, these are both necessary and worthwhile projects - in terms of the political economy of
law, and its practice in the United States. Extended hyper-discussion of the value of the cases are also
critical within the interior communication of self-contained systems, the outward expressions of which
are the cases themselves.
27. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 1349. Five members of the Court joined in a majority opinion written
by Justice Kennedy. Justices Stevens and Breyer joined Justice Souter's concurrence in the judgement.
See id. at 1357 (Souter, J., concurring).
28. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct. at 2457. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Stevens filed a
dissent in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. See id. at 2459. Justice Souter filed a
dissent in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. See id. at 2478 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. We understand that this two stage process is common to constitutional lawmaking in the courts.
See Larry Cat, Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgement. Judicial Transmogrification of Case
Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 611
(1998); Larry Cati Backer, Inventing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative and
Antipathy in U.S. and British Courts, 71 TuL. L. REv. 529 (1996).
2000]
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determined that the fee program created a public forum "by close analogy, 30 that
the public forum cases imposed a standard of viewpoint neutrality,31 that
extraction of fees for coerced speech cases did not apply because the coerced
speech was viewpoint neutral,32 the "germane speech" coerced speech cases were
unworkable in the school student fee cases,33 an opt-out or optional refund system
was not necessary (but available as an alternative) 34 and that viewpoint neutrality
was a sufficient protection against First Amendment abuses by the university.
35
Justice Souter argued, concurring in the judgement, "that the First Amendment
interest claimed by the student respondents ... here is simply insufficient to merit
protection by anything more than the viewpoint neutrality already accorded by the
university, and.., would go no further.
3 6
In Boy Scouts of America, the majority first determined that the Boy Scouts
of America ('BSA") was an "expressive association," 37 'and second that the BSA
was a public accommodation for purposes of the First Amendment,38 but one to
which the First Amendment applied to protect the expressive rights of the
association39 against those of the "avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.,
40
Justice Stevens, in dissent, first extolled the progressive values of New Jersey in
ending all manner of social discrimination, and agreed that the BSA was
characterizable as a public accommodation, but that the requirement to hire a gay
man as an assistant scoutmaster would neither impose a serious burden on BSA's
"collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals... nor does it force BSA to
communicate any message that it does not wish to endorse. 41 Justice Souter
added only an emphasis of his disagreement with the majority that the BSA was
42somehow an association with an avowed anti-homosexual mission.
On its simplest level, these cases decide merely that a student may not avoid
payment of mandatory student activity fees, even if a portion of the fees fund
expression with which the student disagrees, and that the BSA may discriminate
against gay males and forbid their membership in BSA. These are safe, traditional
conclusions. Our .society clings to the belief that universities are places where
30. Southworth, 120 S. Ct at 1354.
31. Id. It still is not clear whether this viewpoint neutrality standard applies in a special way in the
case of religious speech. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995) discussed by Justice Souter in his concurring opinion in Southworth, 120 S. Ct at 1360 & n.6
(Souter, J., concurring).
32. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 1354-56.
33. Md. at 1355.
34. Id. at 1355-56.
35. 1& at 1356-57. The majority opinion was careful to exclude certain groups from its decision,
including university faculty, on whom imposition of the holding would result in severe restrictions on
their power to speak in class. See id. at 1357 & 1361 (Souter, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 1357-58 (Souter, J., concurring).
37. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct. at 2454-55.
38. Id. at 2455-56.
39. Id. at 2457.
40. Id. at 2455.
41. Id. at 2460 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing, in part, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984)).
42. See id. at 2478-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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"almost-adults" can play with all sorts of ideas before they assume positions of
authority in society.43 It also clings to the belief that homosexual is something that
parents prefer their children not to be.44 But our society has also developed, and
deeply invested, in myths about the general level of social tolerance for personal
expression and acceptance of others which contribute to cultural notions of
national superiority - a "beacon unto the world" for the emulation of others.45 The
trick is to affirm our traditional social practices without harming our myths. This
task was once an easy one for the courts.46 But the twentieth century saw a
marked deterioration of the consensus within the American elites with respect to
basic issues of social organization.47 In many countries this deterioration has led to
43. Justice Souter is particularly eloquent in this regard. See id.
44. This self-perpetuating myth is self-referentially reinforced in the courts:
Judges quickly learn from the narratives of their courts that the sodomite loves children.
Unwilling to breed any for himself, he recruits them from among otherwise innocent
children. We commonly believe that sexual non-conformists try to get sexually involved with
children. Sodomites target both the willing and the unwilling. Sodomites target boy and girl
children. Further, the belief feeds the commonly held fears that young people become life-
long 'homosexuals' after being "recruited" by adults.
Larry CatA Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative,
Jurisprudence and Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REv. 529, B572 (1996).
See, e.g., ALBERT D. KLASSEN ET AL., SEX AND MORALITY IN THE U.S. 171-173, 179-83 (1989)
(reporting belief of many that gay men are dangerous, wanting to seduce children and colleagues); M.J.
Eliason & C.E. Randall, Lesbian Phobia in Nursing Students, 13(3) WESTERN J. OF NURSING RES. 363-
374 (1991); J.W. Plasek & J. Allard, Misconceptions of Homophobia, 10 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 23-37
(1984).
45. See, e.g., MARTIN E. MARTY, PROTESTANTISM IN THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE
(2d ed. 1986); but see ISAAC KRAMNICK AND LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE
CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996).
46. See Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (polygamy); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)
(same); Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (constitutionality of racial separation). This social
confirmatory function was one for which the courts were naturally suited within our system of
governance. "[The] Court is institutionally incapable of doing anything other than reflecting the very
majoritarian preference that the traditional model requires the Court to resist." GIRARDEAU SPANN,
RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
19 (1995).
47. I have observed in the context of the American social understanding of the meaning of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment that:
We in the West, and the United States in particular, have sought to have our cake and eat it
too. We chose the nominal, the fictive, framework of law. Yet this foundation of law we
permeated with and made beholden to an even deeper foundational choice. We held as
beyond dispute the primacy of the Christian religious foundation of that legal foundation.
Secular law was to be the official basis of the ordering of our world; religion its object and
handmaid, living in her own chamber and presiding over her own adherents in the space
made available to her. JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 35 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1 (Charles L. Sherman, ed. 1937) (1689). The understanding,
however, was that only schismatic theology was to be relegated to the world of the
subordinate. Practice of the Christian religions were to be subordinate to the generality of
law. But Christian teaching was to be supreme; law was to remain subordinate to the
fundamental belief structures of the Christian religions. We were to remain a nation
constructed on the rock of Christian Biblical foundationalism on which there was
unquestioned agreement of its naturalness. "The vast majority of Americans assumed that
theirs was a Christian, i.e. Protestant country, and they automatically expected that
government would uphold the commonly agreed on Protestant ethos and morality."
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (1986). We said one thing and meant another at a
time when the meaning and limits of our foundational nation building subterfuge was clear
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internal war.43 In the United States it has fostered a period of unparalleled
litigation-warfare by other means.
49
The Southworth and Boy Scouts of America cases demonstrate the difficulty
of this exercise in the early twenty-first century. To affirm what would have
passed as pedestrian fifty years ago, to get to the simple holding in each case, the
majorities were required to build from the facts presented "factual vessals"
suitable for navigating through the shoals of several complex doctrines to arrive at
a determination made "inevitable" by its construction of the facts. The most
important of these doctrines - the public forum, viewpoint neutrality, compelled
speech, expressive association, public accommodation, and germane associative
purpose doctrines - occupy pride of place in the opinions. Our rights of speech
and association have been hurled into the maze of these doctrines; vindication of
the doctrines is paramount, and the speech and association rights protected
incidental to the vindication of particular results based on descriptions of
navigation through this maze. Nuance has been elevated to constitutional value
par excellence. And therein lies the degeneration of constitutional jurisprudence.
But one might be inclined to react to my assertions here as crazy talkl
Indeed, American scholars are applauded for repeating the common wisdom that
the richness of the nuance and complexity with which American jurists approach
the interpretation of the American "Grundgesetz" is evidence of vigor rather than
of decay.50  The American juridical system of constitutional interpretation is
and well understood.
But we have truly reaped the whirlwind. For the rock of Biblical foundationalism has been
shattered by the staff of it servant, the law. We now have inherited our structural choice in
full measure. The nominal structure created, the pseudo-foundation of law overlaying the
true foundation of (the Christian) Religions, has become our foundation in fact. Like so
much dross within the crucible of our socio-cultural migration has Religion fallen away as the
undercoating of our fictive legal foundationalism. It is victim not only to the antipode B law
B but to the theological struggles over the true source of belief as non-Christian Religions vie
with the old monopoly religious group for the right to serve as the "true source" of religious
socio-cultural foundation in the United States.
Larry CatAi Backer, There Can be Only One: Law, Religion, Grammar and The Organization of Society
in the United States in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 425, 426 (Stephen M. Feldman,
ed., 2000).
48. On the repercussions of these divisions, see, e.g., Chaim Kaufmann, Intervention in Ethnic and
Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can be Done and the Other Can't, 6(1) SECURITY STUDIES 62 (1996).
49. Cf. CARL VON CLAUSEWrZ, ON WAR 402 (Anatol Rapoport and Col. J.J. Graham, eds.,
Penguin Books 1968) ("Der Krieg ist nichts anderes als die Fortsetzung der politik mit anderer
Mittelen" (War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse)).
50. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 35-66 (1987). Indeed,
some academics who criticize the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence would have more rather than
less, of this interpretive mode, just modified to better take into account the author finds more
important.
[The] problem with First Amendment decision-making is for the most part not with the
method employed but with the values held by the decision makers. The path to first
amendment safety lies not in the imposition of a particular method, but in a genuine cultural
commitment to substantive first amendment values. If that commitment is not present, no
'binding' method will hold. If that commitment exists, method will take care of itself.
STEVEN SHIFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 110 (1990). It is the
business of the legal academy to think in these terms. A wonderful example is provided in Jeffrey
Rosen's introduction to a symposium issue of a law review on textualism in the federal constitution.
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attempting, with the tools of common law logic, to overcome the problem of
constitutional specificity.51 Yet, this enterprise has forced the judiciary into a
perhaps inescapable pattern of interpretation with an infinitely elastic tolerance of
complexity, nuance, rule, and exception that will never satisfactorily resolve all
52
conceivable issues that may arise. The byproducts of this system, difficult to
flush, may eventually cause the collapse of this system of its own weight, or its
abandonment because, having become so engorged with detail, point and
counterpoint, thrust and counter-thrust, rule and exception, it will prove useless.
The Southworth and Boy Scouts of America cases offer a window into this
process and its frustrations. The cases presented problems of fairly typical
complexity for the Supreme Court. Their resolution was far less straightforward.
Consider all of the contextual problems the Court had to overcome before an
answer to the question posed in each case became "inevitable" - though in
different directions - for the justices. The cases highlight the patchwork of
overlapping doctrine which are fungible as applied, and in which each additional
case reshapes the quantum of doctrine without increasing predictability or
understandability. The juridification of the everyday is the ultimate decadence of
the American approach to the interpretation of constitutional protections.5 3 Its
ultimate "reward" will be irrelevance - sunk by its gross juristic overweight and
incomprehensibility. 54
See Jeffrey Rosen, Introduction to Symposium: Textualism and the Constitution, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1081 (1998) (and for articles in the symposium, see id. passim). On state constitutionalism and its
peculiar conundrum, see, e.g., Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State
Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (1999).
51. The problem of specificity is well known to students of business enterprises. It suggests the
impossibility of achieving complete specificity, the anticipation and provision of solutions to all
contingencies that may arise in the context of the particular context for which specificity is sought. For
a contextual discussion of rights of expression, see, e.g., Steven J. Heyman,, Foundations and Limits of
Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1275 (1998). He notes that:
Several points follow for the modem understanding of First Amendment problems.
First, there is no inherent limit to the interest in free speech, other than the desire to
engage in it. The same is true where free speech is reconceived as a right coextensive
with that interest. By the same token, there are no inherent limits to the social
interests that may come into competition with speech. It follows that there is an
inescapable conflict between free speech and other interests. Finally, there is no
objective standard by which to resolve such conflicts.
Id. at 1306.
52. This result is not limited to the First Amendment by any means. See, e.g., Norman J. Fry, Note:
Lampretch v. FCC: A Looking Glass Into the Future of Affirmative Action?, 61 GEO. WASH. U. L.
REV. 1895 (1993). "Through some 35 decisions over the next 30 years, the Court found itself constantly
reviewing case-by-case circumstances with slightly different factual twists because the "totality of the
circumstances" test simply failed to give lower courts, executives, or legislatures clear guidance as to
what would, and would not, pass constitutional muster." Id. n.33 (referring to use of Due Process
Clause to determine whether confessions are involuntary and thus violate due process).
53. See, generally Larry Catd Backer, The Incarnate Word, that Old Rugged Cross and the State: On
the Supreme Court's October 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic
Absurdity as Jurisprudence, 31 TULSA L. J. 447 (1996).
54. Indeed, the irrelevance of judicial pronouncement in connection with the desegregation of the
American educational system or the issue of abortion, suggests the increasing ineffectiveness of our
judicial organs.
School desegregation, it is true, has been compelled by Brown. [347 U.S. 483 (1954)]
Brown did articulate a social consensus of the highest aspirations of American
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A. The Public Forum Doctrine.
The public forum doctrine has been an important tool of constitutional
expansion.55 It has permitted the state to closely regulate the private conduct of its
citizens using as a basis the conduct norms originally meant for the state and its
instrumentalities. 6 The importance of the public forum doctrine lies in its effect -
it is a gateway doctrine. Once found to be a public forum, the state may impose on
those who maintain the forum the constitutional requirements imposed on the
state. 7
Still, merely understanding the parameters of the doctrine is not enough.
The doctrine, or more accurately its effects, may also be imposed in contexts in
which there does not exist a public forum. Thus, the Southworth majority
conceded, the student fee assessment and the fund created thereby, "is not a
public forum in the traditional sense of the term."58 This proved no impediment.
The majority applied the "lessons" from application of that doctrine "despite the
society. Yet, almost fifty years after that decision, American society continues to
resist the coercive'power of Brown. The decision has altered residential patterns,
rates of private school attendance, and increased the allure of "states rights" politics.
The decision has substantially failed to force integration of American public schools.
The courts appear ready to abandon that effort. Likewise, Roe v. Wade [410 U.S.
113 (1973)] permitted women the right to an abortion. But twenty five years after the
decision, changing patterns of social organization and norms have significantly
increased the difficulty of obtaining even a "legal" abortion. Medical schools do not
emphasize instruction in abortion procedures, hospitals do not permit the procedure,
and fewer doctors perform the service for fear of retaliation.
Larry Catd Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Interpretive Conversations Between
Courts and Culture, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291,298-299 (2000). For a discussion of desegregation
in this context, see, e.g., GIRARDEAU SPANN, RAcE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT
AND MINORrTEs IN CONTEMPORARY AMERIcA 19 (1995); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second
Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993). Cf. Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43,96-98 (1988).
55. My purpose here is not to recite a history of the development, purpose, socio-cultural or legal
politics of the doctrine. That I leave for others. For a history of the development and use of the public
forum doctrine, see, e.g., David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143,
150-60 (1992); Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum--From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1535, 1539-49 (1998); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713,1718-58 (1987). For arguments supportive of the
doctrine, see, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories,
1992 SUP. CT. REv. 79 (1992); Gary C. Leedes, Pigeonholes in the Public Forum, 20 U. RIcH. L. REv.
499 (1986). For arguments on the unworkability of the doctrine, see, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes, The
Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109
(1986); David A. Stoll, Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at Kennedy Airport, Injuring Nine: International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1271 (1993).
56. See. e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(Court held that it was constitutionally impermissible to deny religious groups after hours access to
school facilities otherwise made available to a wide range of other groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (members of registered religious group at a state university entitled to access to
university facilities under the university's open forum program); PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (shopping center a public forum so that individuals may exercise state
protected speech rights on that property); Susan Ehrmann, Note, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District. Creating Greater Protection for Religious Speech Through the Illusion of
Public Forum Analysis, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 965. Cf, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
57. See, e.g., John W. Whitehead & Alexis I. Crow, Beyond Establishment Clause Analysis in Publ;ic
School Situations: The Need to Apply the Public Forum and Tinker Doctrines, 28 TULSA L.J. 149 (1992).
58. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 1354.
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circumstance that those cases [public forum cases] most often involve a demand
for access, not a claim to be exempt from supporting speech."59
However, the application by analogy of this doctrine might not have been
either necessary or appropriate. Justice Souter makes a strong case that the
majority was too quick to rush to an answer "by analogy." 6 Sadly, Justice Souter
can offer only another doctrine to aid the analysis - the government subsidy of
speech doctrine - and that, only by analogy.6
B. The Viewpoint Neutrality Doctrine.
The viewpoint neutrality doctrine is a consequential rule. A set of
circumstances found to fall within the public forum doctrine is then subject to a
standard of conduct with respect to the regulation of conduct within these "fora."
That standard imposes a requirement of "viewpoint neutrality" on the regulation
of the conduct of those within the fora.62
But the constitution of viewpoint neutrality is not often easy to discern in the
regulation of any given forum. The University of Virginia recently discovered this
in the course of a review of the University's policies for admitting, or denying
63
admission to applicants to its forum. Moreover, the viewpoint neutrality doctrine
may directly clash with an equally strong constitutional limitation on government
and its instrumentalities - the Religion clauses.64 Sadly, a majority of the justices
did not see the conflict that was so apparent to Justice Souter. Instead, the
majority in Rosenberger adopted the position that state sponsorship of religious
speech was not constitutionally suspect if it was only one of many forms of speech
sponsored. A gaggle of speech, in other words, drowns Establishment Clause
59. Id.
60. See id. at 1360 (Souter, J., concurring). "Unlike the majority, I would not hold that the mere fact
that the University disclaims speech as its own expression takes it out of the scope of our jurisprudence
on government directed speech." Id. at 1360 n.8.
61. Although the facts here may not fit neatly under our holdings on government speech, (and
the university has expressly renounced any such claim),... our cases do suggest that under
the First Amendment the government may properly use its tax revenue to promote general
discourse. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 ... (1976) (per curiam), we rejected a challenge to
a congressional program providing viewpoint neutral subsidies to all Presidential candidates
based in part on this reasoning: '[The program] is a congressional effort, not to abridge,
restrict or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public
discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.
Thus, [the program] furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values.'
The same consideration goes against the fee payer's speech objection to the scheme here.
Id. at 1360-61 (Souter, J., concurring).
62. It is not my purpose here to report extensively on the viewpoint neutrality doctrine. To the
extent that the viewpoint neutrality doctrine is a consequential doctrine, it is dependent on the public
forum analysis for its application. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence:
The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1986).
63. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
64. "Of course, I believe that even a government program that promotes a broad range of
expression is subject to the specific prohibition on government funding to promote religion, imposed by
the Establishment Clause." Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 1360 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
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objections to state sponsored religious speech.65 Indeed, in Southworth, the
majority took a moment to congratulate itself on the way its conception of the
problem/solution in that case fit neatly with the equally ingenious approach of the
majority in Rosenberger.6 "The proper measure, and the principal standard of
protection for objecting students, we conclude, is the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality in the allocation of funding support."67  In so doing, the majority
constructs "a new category of First Amendment interests and a new standard of
viewpoint neutrality protection". 68
C. The Compelled Speech Doctrine.
The problem with the public forum and viewpoint neutrality doctrines is that
neither applies cleanly to the complaining student's problem in Southworth. But
another line of cases, providing the outlines of another interpretive doctrine, might
provide the basis of a definitive constitutional interpretation - the compelled
speech doctrine.69 The compelled speech doctrine is used as a shorthand for the
constitutional limitation of the power of a government or its instrumentalities - a
public employees labor union or a state bar associationn - to force individuals to
subsidize speech with which they do not agree.72
While it was clear that the students in Southworth stood in the same shoes as
the non-union teachers in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education or the California
attorneys in Keller v. State Bar of California, that connection was not enough for
the majority in the Southworth case to apply the compelled speech doctrine.
Instead, Southworth adds wrinkles to the compelled speech doctrine - it is not
enough to show that an instrumentality of government is coercing speech from an
65. The majority reminds readers that in Rosenberger "we rejected the argument [that any
association with a student newspaper advancing religious viewpoints would violate the Establishment
Clause], holding that the school's adherence to a rule of viewpoint neutrality in administering its
student fee program would prevent 'any mistaken impression that the student newspaper speaks for the
University."' Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 1356 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,841 (1995). For a discussion, see generally, Larry Cati Backer, The
Incarnate Word, that Old Rugged Cross and the State: On the Supreme Court's October 1994 Term
Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic Absurdity as Jurisprudence, 31 TULSA L. J.
447 (1996).
66. See Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 1356. "There is symmetry then in our holding here and in
Rosenberger Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring the student to pay the fees in the
first instance and for ensuring the integrity of the program's operation once the funds have been
collected." See id.
67. Id. at 1356.
68. Id- at 1357 (Souter, J., concurring). Here, Justice Souter argues, the majority has crafted law for
the university and provided it with a "cast-iron viewpoint neutrality requirement to uphold [the
university's interests]." Id.
69. See Abood v. Detroit Bd of Edu, 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of CaL, 496 U.S. 1
(1990).
70. SeeAbood, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
71. See Keller, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
72 Abood involved the assessment of a service fee, in lieu of union dues, payable by non-union
teachers to the union that were used to fund union activities, including political activities. Abood, 431
U.S. at 211. Keller involved the payment by California attorneys of a mandatory union fee used by the
bar association in part to fund political activity. Keller, 496 U.S. at 4-6.
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individual, either directly73 or indirectly.74  An injured party will have to
demonstrate that its interests are stronger than those of the instrumentality in
using the funds for the speech of which the injured party complains. First, in cases
of direct coercion, the party whose speech rights are allegedly impaired will have
to demonstrate that the speech in question was not germane to the purposes of the
instrumentality that receives the injured party's funds.75  "The standard of
germane speech as applied to student speech at a university is unworkable,
however, and gives insufficient protection both to the objecting students and to the
University program itself., 76 Second, in the case of indirect speech coercion, the
neutral forum doctrine will trump the compelled speech doctrine. Where the
instrumentality does indeed coerce funds from a party and distributes those funds
to others who use it for speech, the party may suffer no constitutional injury, no
injury to the party's speech rights, if the instrumentality meets the requirements of
a neutral forum.77 Yet, as Justice Souter points out, this may be elevating
academic freedom to unwarranted constitutional status.78 These wrinkles thus
make the compelled speech doctrine harder than ever to apply - and ensure
73. In both Abood and Keller, the coerced speech might be deemed direct because the
instrumentality receiving the funds used it to fund its own speech.
74. In Southworth, the coerced speech might be deemed indirect because the recipient of the fees
actually plays the role of middleman - no using the funds to speak, but rather directing the funds to
others who will speak.
75. See Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 1355. The germane speech prong of this doctrine was crystallized
in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S.
866 (1998) (affirming Lehnert's germane speech test).
76. Southworth, 120 S. Ct at 1355. The majority also suggested that the standard of germane speech
might prove unworkable as the basis for distinguishing between impermissible compelled subsidies of
another's speech, and permissible mandatory fees. "Even in the context of a labor union, whose
functions are, or so we might have thought, well known and understood by the law and the courts after
a long history of government regulation and judicial involvement, we have encountered difficulties in
deciding what is germane and what is not." Id. at 1355. The majority cited Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) in which the justices could not agree on what expressive activities were
germane to the mission of the association. It may well be that the majority is signaling an intent to
abandon the germane speech rules or to limit Abood and Keller to their facts.
77. In the university context, the instrumentality requires more than this. The university must also
determine, in good faith, that it will create this neutral forum as part of its educational mission.
The University may determine that its mission is well served if students have the means to
engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political
subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall. If the University reaches
this conclusion, it is entitled to impose a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue to these
ends.
The University must provide some protection to its students' First Amendment interests,
however. The proper measure, and the principal standard of protection for objecting
students, we conclude, is the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding
support.
Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 1356. It will be curious to see whether, for the majority at least, the compelled
speech or the neutral forum doctrines apply in a case where no such pedagogical determination is
farced made.
78. While we have spoken in terms of a wide protection for the academic freedom and
autonomy that bars legislatures (and courts) from imposing conditions on the spectrum of
subjects taught and viewpoints expressed in college teaching (as the majority recognizes... ),
we have never held that universities lie entirely beyond the reach of students' First
Amendment rights.
Id. at 1359 (Souter, J., concurring).
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another generation of litigation to answer the questions opened by Southworth.
But Justice Souter would really go farther. Rather than use Southworth as a
vehicle for questioning the utility of the coerced speech rules, he would distinguish
the compelled speech cases and perhaps begin the process of limiting them to their
facts. For Justice Souter, the coerced speech doctrine is strongest when applied to
situations where the fee payer directly funds the organization promoting the
79objectionable speech. It is weakest when the interests of the government are
strongest.80 But Justice Souter stops short of suggesting either a bright line test, or
the general inapplicability of the doctrine in this context. The power of review is
too strong to close the door to judicial reinterpretation in any doctrinal context.8'
D. The Expressive Association Doctrine.
The Court in Southworth was concerned about the character of the
expressive forum provided by the government instrumentality. In Boy Scouts of
America, the Court went to some lengths to explain the rules for determining the
meaning and'effect of an expressive association.82 The expressive association
doctrine is shorthand for the rule that First Amendment protection for association
speech can extend only to those ideas that the organization was formed to express.
As such, it is a gateway doctrine. The application of the public accommodation
and germane speech doctrines to limit an association's First Amendment rights
depends on this critical assessment of the expressive purpose of associations. Prior
to Boy Scouts of America, the expressive association had a burden of proving the
range and purpose of its expressive association, and the courts were free to arrive
at their own conclusions with respect to the expressive purposes of association.
Boy Scouts of America adds a wrinkle that critically affects the applicability of the
germane speech and public accommodation doctrines - it adopts a rule of
discretion which appears to limit a court's ability to question assertions of
associative purposes.
79. [In Abood and Keller] the connection between the forced contributor and the ultimate
message was as direct as the unmediated contribution to the organization doing the speaking.
The student contributor, however, has to fund only a distributing agency having itself no
social, political or ideological character and itself engaging ... in no expression of any
distinct message.... [T]hus, the clear connection between fee payer and offensive speech
that loomed large in our decisions in the union and bar cases is simply not evident here.
Id. at 1360 (Souter, J., concurring).
80. [O]ur prior compelled speech and compelled funding cases are distinguishable on the basis
of the legitimacy of the governmental interest. No one disputes the University's assertion
that some educational value is derived from the activities supported by the fee.... whereas
there was no governmental interest in mandating union or bar association support beyond
supporting the collective bargaining and professional regulatory functions of those
organizations.
Id. at 1361 (Souter, J., concurring).
81. It is ironic that no one on the Court thought to argue the right not to listen. Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollock, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). The student's position in this case might well be close to
that of the street railway rider in Pollock forced to sit in the car and listen to broadcast radio programs.
The student, as much as the rail car passengers is a captive audience. Justice Douglas's argument that
people in such circumstances are entitled to be protected from listening, continues to be rejected. See
id.
82. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct. at 2454-55.
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There is irony here between the way the Court examined the purposes and
missions of similar expressive organizations in different contexts. In determining
the extent of the "message" of an expressive organization for first amendment
purposes when the organization is seeking to prevent a homosexual from joining,
the Court applies a deferential test to determining the expressive range of the
association's goals.83 The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens characterizes well
this new standard:
[T]he majority insists that we must 'give deference to an association's assertions
regarding the nature of its expression' and 'we must also give deference to an
association's view of what would impair its expression.' So long as the record
'contains written evidence' to support a group's bare assertion, '[we] need not
inquire further.' Once the organization 'asserts' that it engages in particular
expression, '[w]e cannot doubt' the truth of that assertion.'84
In these cases, then, "associations do not have to associate for the 'purpose'
of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the
first Amendment."8 5 Moreover, "even if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout leaders
from disseminating views on sexual issues.., the First Amendment protects the
Boy Scouts' method of expression., 86 Last, "the First Amendment simply does not
require that every member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group's
policy to be 'expressive association."' s As such, the New Jersey Supreme Court
committed error by carefully parsing through the BSA's purposes and determining
whether the retention of Dale would substantially impair its expressive
associational purpose.88
This rule of deference is new. Deference of this sort represents a substantial
departure from recent cases. 89 The sort of deference standard articulated stands as
an irresistible temptation, on the part of the unscrupulous or the zealot, to "cheat."
Form will indeed be elevated over substance in a way found intolerable in the
earlier opinions of the Court. The new standard thus has substantial ramifications.
This new deferential standard vests burden shifting with a substantial
constitutional effect. For the majority, it constitutes a sly use of procedure to
undercut the thrust of prior court made interpretive doctrine without the bother of
overturning the prior result - or even acknowledging the nature of the
constitutional project attempted. It "pretermits [the] entire analysis" at the heart
of the germane speech doctrine in public accommodation cases. 9° Ironically, the
83. "As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we
must also give deference to an association's view of what would impair its expression." Id. at 2453.
84. Id. at 2470-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
85. Id at 2454. "An association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in
order to be entitled to protection." Id
86. Id. at 2454-55.
87. Id. at 2455. "The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views from the housetops, or
that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment
protection." Id.
88. See Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.
89. See id. at 2470.
90. See the discussion of the Germane Speech doctrine infra text at notes 102-115.
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path chosen by the majority , this constitutional distortion in the service of the
"anti-homosexual" crusade, may prove as useful to gay rights advocates as it
proved to the Boy Scouts.91
E. The Public Accommodation Doctrine.
The public accommodation doctrine arose as the judicial gloss approving and
regulating the state's power to interfere with private individual's power to freely
associate with others.92 The public accommodation doctrine permits a state, or the
federal government, to reach to what might otherwise be considered the private
conduct of individuals or groups when the activity is characterized as "public"
enough to permit its regulation through laws designed to reach governmental
(public) conduct. At its limit, of course, a state might be able to characterize all
conduct of formally non-governmental individuals or groups as either public or
private, according to its wont, and the tolerance of the electorate. Neither state
legislatures nor courts have contemplated that extreme, but there is no principled,
or at least logical, reason for avoiding either.93
Until Boy Scouts of America, one could generally presume that once a court
determined that a place was one of public accommodation, the limitations of the
statute would apply - that is the prohibitions against discrimination on account of
the categories listed in the statute. Boy Scouts of America appears to change that
equation, by weighing far more heavily the constitutional mass of the expressive
purpose of the "public accommodation" to be regulated, than that of the "rights"
protected. The application of the public accommodation doctrine is now heavily
dependent on the characterization of the expressive purposes of the regulated
association in relation to the distinguishing characteristics of the group protected
by the public accommodation statutes. If the group to be protected is not one
which is the object of federal constitutional protection, then the expressive right to
exclude trumps the state's command to include, even when the expressive
community can somehow be characterized as "public." The logic of the decision in
91. See Nan Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent For Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (2000).
92. For a discussion of the public accommodation laws and their regulation by the courts, see, e.g.,
Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U.
L. REV. 1283 (1996); Margaret E. Koppen, The Private Club Exemption from Civil Rights
Legislation-Sanctioned Discrimination or Justified Protection of Right to Associate?, 20 PEP?. L. REV.
643, 645 (1993); Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Project, Discrimination in Access to
Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodation Laws,7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 215 (1978). For an "official" version of this history, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
627-29 (1996) (development of public accommodation laws); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1995) (Massachusetts's public
accommodation law). For a list of states with public accommodation statutes, see, Michelle L.
Carusone, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and Monmouth Council: New Jersey's Attempt to Define
Places of Public Accommodation and Remedy the "Cancer of Discrimination," 49 CATHOLIC L. REV.
823, & n.22 (2000).
93. And, indeed, there is no reason for uniformity in this regard either. Thus, one of the hallmarks
of public accommodation law is the variety, at least at the margin, of the coverage of the law, both in
terms of the groups covered and the sorts of accommodations deemed "public." See Sally Frank, The
Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door: The Application of Antidiscrimination Laws to Quasi-Private
Clubs, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 27,40-44 (1994).
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Boy Scouts of America makes its holding almost inevitable once the majority
determined that a significant expressive purpose of the BSA was antipathy to an
individual belonging to a group antipathy against which was now prohibited by the
public accommodations statute of New Jersey.94
Conversely the substantial inquiry directed at expressive associations applies
only in those cases in which the excluded individual belongs to a protected group
and alleges exclusion based on group status. 5 If so, then perhaps the majority is
suggesting that in cases where the state's interest in protecting against
discrimination based on constitutionally protected status - sex, religion, race,
ethnicity - the Court must apply a "no-deference" standard to the determination of
the purposes of an expressive organization's mission.96  However, where the
exclusion involves a group which is not constitutionally protected under the
federal constitution, then the Court is required to take the expressive association
at its word with respect to its expressive mission, and on that basis short circuit the
public accommodation and germane speech doctrines.97 But the majority does
this, if it does this at all, on the sly.
Perhaps the deference depends on the situation. In the coerced speech
situation, the complainant is an individual whose speech is coerced by the
association. 98 In the expressive association context, the roles are reversed and it is
the association itself that argues coercion at the hands of the individual. 99 But
even if this model of distinction works, it must also contain an exception for
women who challenge their exclusion from all male clubs.1°° The logic of that
exception lead to the need for further exceptions for other protected groups, and
then we are back to wondering whether the rule of deference is really a shorthand
for creating two standards, one which substantially limits the reach of the public
accommodation doctrine where the excluded individual does not belong to a
94. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct. at 2452-54.
95. The majority in Boy Scouts of America noted that the Court had "recognized in cases such as
Roberts and Duarte that states have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women
in public accommodations." Id. at 2456.
96. The majority opinion explains that "in the associational freedom cases such as Roberts, Duarte
and New York State Club Ass'n., after finding a compelling state interest, the Court went on to examine
whether or not the application of the state law would impose any 'serious burdens' on the
organization's rights of expressive association. So in these cases, the associational interest in freedom
of expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State's interests on the other." Id. at 2456.
97. Apparently, in those cases, the State's constitutional interest in extending state constitutional
protection to other groups cannot be used to limit the federal constitutional protections to speech and
association granted to expressive associations. Thus, even if the New Jersey Constitution provided the
basis of the public accommodation law, the deferential standard would still apply.
98. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (constitutionally protected right to cover up
the New Hampshire state motto on auto license plates); Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Ed., 431 U.S. 209
(1977) (public sector union employee use of dues); Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990)
(mandatory state bar dues used for lobbying and other political activity).
99. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (parade organizer not required to include groups with whose message it disagrees).
100. If not, then the Court would have to overrule Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) and its
progeny - Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537; New York State
Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); a step the Boy Scouts of America Court
expressly refused to take.
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protected class. 101 If so, the subterfuge and concealment of its creation, through
this rule of discretion, does not make the application of constitutional principles in
everyday contexts any easier.
Yet, isn't this precisely what we ought to expect from a decadent
jurisprudence? The result of this furious argument is substantial uncertainty in a
core collateral doctrine of First Amendment jurisprudence - it is clear that the
Court now controls, on the basis of criteria known only to itself, the time and
manner of its examination of the purposes for which expressive associations are
formed.
Yet, the majority in Boy Scouts of America attempts more than that. In Boy
Scouts of America, the majority stretches to make new constitutional doctrine by
the process of analogy.' 2 This time, the object was to stretch the relevance and
utility of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston,
Inc.,'03 the way the majority in Southworth stretched the public forum doctrine to
accommodate the facts as they found them in that case.
In Hurley, we applied traditional first Amendment analysis to hold that the
application of the Massachusetts public accommodations law to a parade violated
the First Amendment rights of the parade organizers. Although we did not deem
the parade in Hurley an expressive association, the analysis we applied there is
similar to the analysis we apply here.14
The dissent, of course, found that "though Hurley has a superficial similarity
to the present case, a close inspection reveals a wide gulf between that case and
the one before us today."'1 5 Ultimately, however, the applicability of Hurley in
Boy Scouts of America depends neither on the public accommodations doctrine
nor the expressive association doctrine, but on the cultural truth of the nature of
'condition' that makes Dale different. Ultimately, the majority's major
contribution to the law of public accommodation might be that an expressive
association has the constitutionally protected right to discriminate against all
101. That would seem to be the logic of cases such as City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)
(upholding Dallas ordinance imposing age restrictions on admission to certain dance halls, though
ostensibly based on a theory of no expressive content, the characteristic of the discrimination was not
any form otherwise constitutionally protected).
102. There is a striking similarity between the use of analogy in Boy Scouts of America and in
Southworth. The majority in Southworth stretched the public forum doctrine to apply, by analogy, but
apply all the same, in the context of indirect support of speech through mandatory student dues. See
discussion supra notes 74-76.
103. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
104. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct. at 2457 n.4 (noting that dicta in Hurley pointed to the
conclusion reached by the majority in Boy Scouts of America.).
105. Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The difference, as the dissent saw it, was that Dale's
"participation sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world." Id. In contrast, the
petitioning group in Hurley was intent on delivering a message of their own as part of their
participation in the parade. "If there is any kind of message being sent, then, it is by mere act of joining
the Boy Scouts. Such an act does not constitute an instance of symbolic speech under the First
Amendment." Id. Moreover, the dissent suggested that Dale, unlike the individuals in Hurley, had no
intention of broadcasting any message, nor is it likely that BSA would be understood to send a message
by hiring Dale. "The notion that an organization of that size and enormous prestige implicitly endorses
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discrete minorities, on whatever basis such association cares to define difference
for purposes of discrimination as long as the discrimination is not affected against
groups which are protected against discrimination by the constitution. States have
power, under their public accommodation laws, to add to the list of
constitutionally protected groups, except that any such protections afforded under
state public accommodation laws may not interfere with the federal constitutional
rights of any group or association.
F. The Germane Associative Purpose Doctrine.
As with the public accommodation doctrine, application of the germane
associative purpose doctrine is heavily dependent on the Court's characterization
of the associative purposes of the expressive community. There are no First
Amendment rights with respect to the incidents of association that do not
substantially burden the expressive purposes of association.1' 6  While an
association is entitled to select members who share the same expressive purposes
as those of the association, it may not otherwise limit the ability of persons to join
on the basis of factors other than disagreement with the expressive mission of the
association. But, as the majority opinion in Boy Scouts of America now makes
clear, the germane associative purpose doctrine is only as effective as the
willingness of a court to independently determine the actual expressive purpose of
an organization. The willingness to find that expressive associations generally
have no germane expressive purpose that cannot be constitutionally burdened in
the face of discrimination against a constitutionally protected group, wilts when
the court is faced with a member of a group against which discrimination is
permitted who seeks the same construction.
This deferential standard, based on the acceptance of an association's own
characterization of its expressive purposes,'07 was not previously used by the
courts.'08 A different test applied.' °9 In those cases, the Court insisted on careful
examination of the purpose of expressive association, requiring an association to
prove, that "admitting women... will affect in any significant way the existing
members ability to carry out their various purposes."" °  Though those cases
106. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) [U.S. Jaycees]; Board of Directors of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) [Rotary Club]; New York State Club Ass'n.,
Inc v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
107. See id. at 2452. "This inquiry necessarily requires us first to explore, to a limited extent, the
nature of the Boy Scouts view of homosexuality." Id. at 2470-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. "This is an astounding view of the law. I am unaware of any previous instance in which our
analysis of the scope of a constitutional right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his
or her brief and inquiring no further." Id. at 2471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. See U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609; Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537; New York State Club Ass'n., Inc, 487
U.S. 1.
110. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548. Justice Stevens explained that:
An organization can adopt the message of its choice, and it is not this court's place to
disagree with it. But we must inquire whether the group is, in fact, expressing a message
(whatever it may be) and whether that message (if one is expressed) is significantly affected
by a State's anti-discrimination law. More critically, the inquiry requires our independent
analysis, rather than deference to a group's litigating posture. Reflection on that subject
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involved attempts by organizations to prevent a woman from joining, until Boy
Scouts of America, that process of inquiry was thought applicable in all contexts in
which an expressive association limited membership."'
The majority opinion does not suggest that Jaycees or Rotary Club are
inapplicable. Indeed, the majority appears to apply Jaycees and Rotary Club.t1
But in reality, the majority did not apply those cases. While they applied the result
of the germane speech doctrine of those cases to the assistant scoutmaster, they
avoided entirely the application of the rules for determining the purpose of
expressive association at the heart of those cases. Justice Steven's dissent,113 as
well as that of Justice Souter,1 4 forcefully highlights this constitutional maneuver
by the majority. In truth, it is hard to believe that the Jaycees and Rotary Club line
of cases can survive Boy Scouts of America, except to the extent that the earlier
cases stand for an empty proposition. The expressive association rule, a gateway
doctrine, has become the constitutionally decisive end in itself. The battleground
now shifts to the procedure for determining the scope of expressive activity and
away from the protection of germane speech and the rights to belong bundled into
the public accommodations doctrine.
On the other hand, perhaps Boy Scouts of America can be distinguished from
Jaycees-Rotary Club. In Boy Scouts of America the individual seeking
membership in an expressive organization was a homosexual, but not just any
homosexual. Dale was "an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist [whose
dictates that such an inquiry is required.
Ia
111. See Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct. at 2471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 2456.
113. See id at 2466-70.
Several principles are made perfectly clear by both Jaycees and Rotary Club. First, to prevail
on a claim of expressive association in the face of a State's anti-discrimination law, it is not
enough simply to engage in some kind of expressive activity. Both the Jaycees and the
Rotary Club engaged in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, yet that fact
was not dispositive. Second, it is not enough to adopt an openly avowed exclusionary
membership policy. Both the Jaycees and the Rotary Club did that as well. Third, it is not
sufficient merely to articulate some connection between the group's expressive activities and
its exclusionary policy. The Rotary Club, for example, justified its male-only membership
policy by pointing to the 'aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the [exclusively] male
membership' and by claiming that only with an exclusively male membership could it
'operate effectively' in foreign countries.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 541.
The relevant question is whether the mere inclusion of the person at issue would 'impose any
serious burden,' 'affect in any significant way,' or be 'a substantial restraint upon' the
organization's "shared goals," "basic goals." or "collective effort to foster beliefs."
Accordingly, it is necessary to examine what, exactly, are BSA's shared goals and the degree
to which its expressive activities would be burdened, affected, or restrained by including
homosexuals.
Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct at 2469-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. "I conclude that BSA has not made out an expressive association claim, therefore, not because
of what BSA may espouse, but because of its failure to make sexual orientation the subject of any
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presence] in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message
from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as
disagreeing with Boy Scout policy."' 15 Perhaps here is where we reach the nub of
the issue for the majority. The majority does what it tells us over and over in the
cases that Courts shouldn't do - they conflate status, conduct, and in this case,
speech, within the sexual desires of Mr. Dale, a conflation it finds logically absurd
in the case of the heterosexual, but "gay-friendly" assistant scoutmaster.1
6
Moreover, the rule of deference flies in the face not only of the Jaycees-
Rotary Club process, but also the process of analysis used in coercive speech cases
when an individual seeks to avoid membership in the expressive activity of an
expressive association. The Court in Southworth reminds us that in cases in which
expressive associations, such as bar associations or public sector unions, "coerce
speech" from members through the assessment of mandatory dues, some of which
is used for expressive speech, the Court will carefully scrutinize the expressive
purposes of the organization to determine whether the speech coerced is germane
to the purpose of the association.11 7 Even though this analysis can be difficult, it is
a task that is at the heart of the application of First Amendment doctrine to
expressive organizations in those contexts." 8 It seems odd that a majority of
justices who are quite willing to carefully examine the expressive purposes of
associations in the context of women seeking admission to all male associations or
individuals seeking to avoid use of their association dues for expressive ends with
which they disagree, should determine that such analysis of association purpose is
unnecessary when a gay man seeks admission to an all male club. Doctrinal
symmetry is broken. Again, we are left to wonder whether the fear of the
homosexual predator1 9 drove the court to constitutional folly.
What was, in Jaycees, Rotary Club, Abood and Keller, a willingness to more
strictly construe the expressive purposes of the organizations in those cases,
becomes, in Boy Scouts of America, a willingness to do the opposite. Yet the
majority provides no explanation for the shift. Indeed, it cloaks the shift in
language that suggests that nothing new has been done. The result guarantees a
new generation of constitutional litigation as individuals and groups explore the
border between Jaycees (seen as favoring the interests of individuals) and Boy
Scouts of America (seen as favoring the interests of associations).
115. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct at 2455.
116. This was not lost on the dissenting Justices. "Under the majority's reasoning, an openly gay
male is irreversibly affixed with the label 'homosexual.' That label, even though unseen, communicates
a message that permits his exclusion wherever he goes. His openness is the sole and sufficient
justification for his ostracism." Id. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Yoshino, Suspect Symbols:
The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1753, 1781-83 (1996)).
117. Southworth, 120 S. Ct at 1355.
118. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
119. See generally Larry Catd Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory:
Sodomy Narrative Jurisprudence and Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REv. 529
(1996) (on the gay man as sexual predator as an archetypal form of judicial expression of the essence of
the average gay male).
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G. The Relevance and Irrelevance of Facts.
Southworth and Boy Scouts of America join a growing line of Supreme Court
cases in which facts are stretched to suit the applicability of doctrine, in this case a
subsidiary doctrine of constitutional interpretation. 12° It is hard for anyone with a
memory to think of the Boy Scouts of America as an organization whose
expressive purpose was to stamp out homosexuality. It is as hard, perhaps, except
during a momentary lapse to see the constitutionally significant connection
between expressive coercion inherent in mandatory fees. And yet, we now
understand, if we understand nothing else, that the Boy Scouts are indeed at the
vanguard of the anti-homosexual crusade. Yet, even if were inclined to see what
the majority saw in Boy Scouts of America, it is hard to keep that vision steady in
the face of the dissent's cogent recharacterization of the expressive purposes of the
BSA. Yet what the case may demonstrate in this regard is the kind of
transformation of facts necessary for our contemporary constitutional doctrinal
maze. The facts of Boy Scouts of America becomes easier to conceptualize were
we, like the majority, to reduce the individual human being at the factual center of
the case to the sum of a matrix of outward characteristics derived from the
American sub-communities to which he has been assigned. Mr. Dale loses his
humanity in the course of his reconstitution as a function of the matrix of
constitutional doctrine. His individuality dies, to be resurrected, after an
appropriate interval in the majority opinion, as the totem for the community for
which he serves as proxy.
The opinion in Southworth is no stranger to this totemic recharacterization of
facts in the service of doctrine. We understand that students can be taxed to buy
speech, so long as the governmental purchaser agrees to buy the speech of
substantially all who proffer speech for the revenue, otherwise the purchaser may
buy no speech at all. The alternative suggestion, so clearly articulated in
Rosenberger,lu that such fees might constitute a constitutionally impermissible
120. Some authors have noted he pattern in the context of race discrimination. See, e.g., Andrew F.
Halaby and Stephen R. McAllister, An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Reliance on Racial "Stigma" as
a Constitutional Concept in Affirmative Action Cases, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 235 (1997) ("These opinions
often seem like an attempt to manipulate the concept of stigma, taking advantage of its perceived
legitimacy as a factor of constitutional magnitude, while in the final analysis leaving Justices free to
achieve whatever end is sought"). Id. at 252-53. I have written about this before, from the perspective
of a growing trend toward absurdity ion Constitutional jurisprudence. See, Larry CatA Backer, The
Incarnate Word, that Old Rugged (Klan) Cross and the State: On the Supreme Court's October 1994
Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic Absurdity as Jurisprudence, 31 TULSA L.
J. 447 (1996).
121. This tendency is nothing new and seems to be a hallmark of modern constitutionalism. "Were
all of the Justices reading from the same set of facts? It appears here that, even at the stage of factual
exposition, our judicial [establishment] ... cannot agree even on what they seel "Larry Cati Backer,
The Incarnate Word, that Old Rugged (Klan) Cross and the State: On the Supreme Court's October 1994
Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic Absurdity as Jurisprudence, 31 TULSA L.
J. 447,458 (1996).
122. Rosenberger v. The University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,840 (1995), citing Keller v. State Bar of
California, 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990) and Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977),
Accord O'Connor, J., concurring, id. at 851. But see Souter, J., dissenting, id. at 873-74, 891-92 (the fee
is a tax used to find religious expression).
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exaction of speech with respect to which the student might seek a refund, is waved
away in Southworth.123 The justices now take it for granted that there is no tax-like
exaction in the assessment of student fees, instead there is merely the collection of
a fee which represents the equivalent of the expression of academic freedom, or
perhaps tuition by another name. Yet it is hard to accept this characterization of
student activity fee as the grease assuring the smooth running of the metaphysical
academic souk when we still have ringing in our ears the alternative
characterization of these fees as something far less benign. Are university's so
different from other groups, like unions or bar associations, which, once joined,
are difficult or impossible to leave without substantial economic effect? Again,
Southworth loses its mystery when the facts of the case are reconstituted in totemic
form. The University stands as the proxy for American socio-economic
organization - the site of the operation of the myth of the democratic free-market
state. To accept regulation of this free market, at the behest of a "customer"
unhappy with some of the tenants of the bazaar, would require rejection of the
free market totem upon which the United States has built its world wide identity.
Thus, the Court is at once weighed down by the baggage of its doctrine and
at the same time using the complexity of doctrine as a way of hiding its expression
of personal politics in its decisions. Perhaps every organization must stand on its
own unique constitutional footing. Justice O'Connor once told us this in
connection with the University of Virginia's student fee program problems.1 24 Yet,
if this is the case, then constitutional jurisprudence truly becomes both complex
and irrelevant. Judgment based on the jurisprudence of peculiar facts, when all
facts are peculiar, becomes no jurisprudence at all2 5 - instead jurisprudence is
reduced to the form of answer to the supplication made to an Old Testament
judge.126 Sadly, however, the cosmology of 21 ' Century Americans, unlike that of
the ancient People of Israel, does not infuse judges with the spirit of God as the
123. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. at 732 (student fees are not a tax, they simply belong to the students),
quoting from Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The reliance on Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Rosenberger is particularly craven, given that Justice O'Connor appeared in
Rosenberger to argue, in the paragraph referenced in Southworth, that the student fee assessed escaped
characterization as a tax because it resembled the mandatory bar dues in Keller, and, as such, might
give rise to the same opt-out rights.
124. Justice O'Connor remarked: "When two bedrock principles so conflict, understandably neither
can provide a definitive answer. Resolution instead depends on the hard task of judging - sifting
through the details and determining whether the challenged program offends the [Constitution]."
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 847 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. Constitutional law, in this sense, provides a grossly exaggerated example of the general
disintegration of the value of precedence by the hyper application of the rules of avoidance. "In
theory, precedence in the common-law countries is a strictly applied principle, but in practice the ability
to distinguish a case means that precedence can be circumvented when it suits the purposes of the
court." Nigel Foster, GERMiAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 4 (2d ed. 1996).
126. Constitutional law, in a sense, follows the pattern of judging in the Biblical book of judges: the
people of Israel "do evil in the sight of the Lord" (Judges 3:7; 3:12; 4:1; 6:1, etc.), they are punished, and
then "cry out to the Lord" (Judges 3:9; 3:15; 4:3; 6:7; etc.), who send them deliverance in the form of a
judge under whom things are made right again. A good judge is one "who will do what is in my mind
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essence of the act of judging.12'
II. Do THE EUROPEAN APPROACHES SUGGEST ALTERNATIVES?
Do other systems of constitutional interpretation suggest an antidote to the
American interpretive model? I look at three alternative approaches for the
suggestion of an answer. The French system grounds issues of constitutional
interpretation on the political process - the judiciary is essentially excluded from
the process, with one exception. The Germans provide a federal judicial forum for
the determination of issues of constitutional interpretation, but limit the
jurisdiction of that judicial body to questions of constitutional law affecting the
German federation. The supra-national approach to the protection of human
rights of the system of the European Convention also relies on quasi-judicial and
judicial approaches to interpretation.128
The French solution to constitutional issues is political and straightforward.
Generally speaking, there is no judicial constitutional review of legislative acts.
Since 1958, however, a Constitutional Council has existed, composed of members
appointed by the President of the Republic and the presiding officers of the
French legislature. 129 This Constitutional Council is convened when certain public
officials submit a provision to it for constitutional review. Such review may be
obtained only prior to the promulgation of the provision. 130 Clearly an interesting
system, but one which is not suitable to the American experience that, while
resting on an affirmation of the rule of law, does not recognize the supremacy of
the law as against the predilections of any jurist.13 ' Even when indulging a
comparative perspective, political reality, along with an understanding of the
inertia of cultural habits, must overcome false hope.
127. "The Spirit of the Lord came upon him, so that he became Israel's judge .... " Judges 3:10. It is
a large leap to infuse the American federal Constitution with the spirit of the Divine, even in this age of
renewed spiritualism.
128. I do not propose in this section to compare the jurisprudence of these European entities to that
of the American Supreme Court in the context of the protection of speech and association rights. My
comparative purpose here is more structural in focus. I examine whether the jurisprudential
framework of the courts of these systems provide another, and perhaps healthier, approach to the
interpretation of basic norms within their societies.
129. See Fr. CONST. (1958), tit. VII, arts. 58-61.
130. For a discussion, see, e.g., ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1992) J. BELL, FRENCH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-56 (1992); F.L. Morton, Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis,
36 AM. J. COMp. L. 89 (1988). Administrative decrees promulgated by the President may be
challenged for legality by the Conceil d'Etat.
131. II s'dcarte bien entendu du system amricain. Celui-ci est A la fois contraire A la tradition
frangaise de souverainetd de la loi et A la conception frangaise de la s6paration des pouvoirs
qui interdisent au juge ordinaire de statuer sur la constitutionalit6 de la loi. Il s'adapte mal
de plus au syst~me existent d'un contr6le a priori exerc6 par un juge unique. Le module
italien est 6galment dcart6, car i conduit A une surabundance de recours, parfois tout A fait
injustifi~s, favorise les manoeuvres dilatoires et entraine une lenteur accrue de la justice.
Quant au mod~te allemand et espagnol, il pr6sente le d6savantage souvent d6nonc6 d'une
plthore de recours directs, pl6thore qui conduit les cours constitutionneIles A ne traiter
qu'une tr~s infime partie des questions qui leur sont soumises.
Laurent Habib, Le Conseil Constitutionel, in SUPRANATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
EUROPE: FUNCTIONS AND SOURCES 215,237 (Igor I. Kavass, ed. 1992).
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The Germans have chosen another path, one perhaps closer to our own
model in spirit. The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) provides protection for
speech132 and assembly.133 The German right of speech is narrower than that in the
black letter of the American First Amendment.134 The same can be said of the
German basic right of association.'35 The basic approach of the German
Constitutional Court is similar to that of the American Supreme Court, yet also
136fundamentally different. The basic difference, in part, may be explained by the
values conveyed by the German and American Constitutions.
The American federal constitution provides no guidance when basic rights
conflict. Neither does it provide any instruction on the manner in which
conflicting rights are to be balanced. In this context, the Supreme Court has
developed rules more noteworthy for their impermanence than for their
substantive value.137 The German Constitutional Court interprets within the
confines of the German Constitution's hierarchy of values, and on that basis
created a sophisticated balancing test in which constitutional values are balanced
against each other in the context of the injuries claimed to be suffered.
The unity of the Constitution and its hierarchy of values are crowning principles of
German Constitutional interpretation. Do these principles limit rights of speech?
Justice Helmut Steinberger wrote that 'Art. 5 operates within an interrelated set of
other fundamental rights and liberties, constitutional principles, rules and standards,
institutional and procedural devices.' And thus, he continued, the freedoms secured
by Article 5 need 'to be reconciled with the rights and liberties of other persons and
groups as well as with other individuals and social interests recognized by the
132. "Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing,
and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally available sources." GG, art. 5(1), translated in
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, App. A at 507 (2d ed. 1997).
133. "All Germans shall have the right to form associations and societies." GG, art. 9(1), translated
in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, App. A at 509 (2d ed. 1997).
134. The Basic Law provides that: "These rights are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the
statutory provisions for the protection of youth, and by the right to personal honor." GG art. 5(2),
translated in DONALD P. KoMMERS, THE CONSTITUIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, App. A at 508 (2d ed. 1997).
135. The Grundsgesetz also provides that: "Associations whose purposes or activities conflict with
criminal laws or are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international
understanding are prohibited." GG, art. 5(1), translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, App. A at 507 (2d ed.
1997)). But see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
215 (1994) ("But the fact is that in periods of real or imagined danger we have tended to adopt
measures strikingly similar in effect to those expressly countenanced by the Basic Law and the
Supreme Court has tended to uphold them - in the teeth of an ostensibly absolute constitutional
protection").
136. For a comparison of approaches in the related area of the regulation of obscenity, see, e.g.,
Mathias Reimann, Prurient Interest and Human Dignity: Pornography Regulation in West Germany and
the U.S., 21 MICH. J. L. REFORM 201 (1987/88).
137. The rise and fall of substance economic due process is a case in point. For a discussion, see, e.g.,
Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV.. 873 (1987). The creation and expansion of social
substantive due process (in the guise of privacy and its related concepts) is another. For a discussion,
see, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (1992).
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Constitution.158
The utility of a hierarchy of values is not something to be dismissed lightly.
Value hierarchy in constitutional rights thus accomplishes the textualist aspirations
of many constitutional law jurists and scholars without sacrificing constitutional
interpretation to the political whims of every generation's crop of textualists,
either in the academy or on the bench. In the area of speech rights, it has proven
to be useful, though not without providing complexity to the law.13 9  Value
hierarchy provides a base from which judges may bring their judgment to bear on
the facts without the need to construct, at the same time, the value ordering,
through subsidiary constitutional doctrine, the law. It provides a discipline for
constitutional interpretation.14° But it leaves the Court with the difficult task of
interest balancing in the particular case.141 Therefore, it is not a guarantee of just
results.' 42
138. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 361 (2d ed. 1997) (quoting in part, Helmut Steinberger, Freedom of the Press and of
Broadcasting and Prior Restraints, in VOLKERRECHT ALS RECHSTORDNUNG, INTERNATIONALE
GERICITSHARKEIT, MENSCHENRECHTE, FESTSCHRIFr FOR HERMANN MOSLER 913 (Rudolf
Bernhardt et al. eds, 1983).
139. Donald Kommers thus outlines the value hierarchy of speech rights in the German Constitution:
First, the value of personal honor always trumps the right to utter untrue statements of fact
made with knowledge of their falsity. If, on the other hand, untrue statements are made
about a person after an effort was made to check for accuracy, the court will balance the
conflicting rights and decide accordingly. Second, if true statements of fact invade the
intimate personal sphere of an individual, the right to personal honor trumps freedom of
speech. But if such truths implicate the social sphere, the court once again resorts to
balancing. Finally, if the expression of an opinion - as opposed to fact - constitutes a serious
affront to the dignity of a person, the value of personal honor triumphs over speech. But if
the damage to reputation is slight, then again the outcome of a case will depend on careful
judicial balancing.
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 424 (2d ed. 1997). See also, Peter Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German
Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247 (1989).
140. In this context it is worth remembering that:
The Federal Constitutional Court constantly reminds itself of the hierarchy of
values implicit in their constitutional order. It has delimited the inner boundaries
of individual autonomy by placing the individual in the context of the polity.
Moreover, it has carved out the outer boundaries of the principle of human
dignity, by weighing the interests of the state and the autonomous individuals
against the backdrop of the strong egalitarian principles of social democrat
thought, and the moral principles of Kantian and Christian thought.
Luis Anibal Aviles Pagan, Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality in the Constitutional Jurisprudence
of Germany, The United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, R EVISTA JURIDICA
UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO 343,383-384 (1998).
141. In applying a balancing test the German Constitutional court has tended:
to apply the more orthodox proportionality principle the Court has developed for testing
limitations on other fundamental rights. A 'general law' restricting expression is valid only if
it is adapted ('geeignt') to the attainment of a legitimate purpose, if it is necessary
('erforderlich') to that end, and if the burden it imposes is not excessive ('unzumutba") in
light of the benefits to be achieved.... [I]n short, despite constitutional provisions that
differ significantly on their face, both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court have
adopted a similar approach to defining the limits of free expression.
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 180-81 (1994).
142. "A balancing test is no more protective of expression than the judges who administer it; only an
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Students of American constitutional law are in the habit of suggesting that
the Supreme Court is imposing a hierarchy of values.143 Even if that is true,
without the benefit of a political approval of the value hierarchy, such judicial
interpretive solutions will always remain transitory and constitutionally suspect.
144
Sadly, constitutional changes of this sort are virtually impossible at the beginning
of the twenty-first century. The Federal Constitution has assumed, in some
respects, the qualities of the Old and New Testaments. 145 As the received word
from those divinely inspired, it is taken as authoritative and difficult to change.
146
Should consensus ever emerge that the Bill of Rights, or the Constitution in its
entirety ought to be revised, perhaps by the calling of a Second Constitutional
Convention, it is likely, in this age of lack of political consensus among the many
political communities inhabiting the United States, that the way would be opened
for revolutionary change, as all segments of American political society would fight
to impose its constitutional will on the revised document. 47
Overlaying both European constitutional approaches is the system of
fundamental rights protections under the European Convention.' 48 The
similarities, between the American federal Supreme Court and the European
Court of Human Rights, have been noted by students of the field. 149 The
examination of the actual decisions can give us an insight into the degree of freedom that prevails in
Germany." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 181
(1994). This sort of judging is not unknown even within the membership of the court as currently
constituted. For example, Justice O'Connor is a strong example of a justice who has been outspoken
about the focus of judges on balancing facts within the confines of a known universe of law. See, e.g.,
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 847, 852. The German approach avoids the need to construct and reconstruct
the value universe.
143. On the judicial construction of a loose, and loosely binding hierarchy of values, see, e.g., T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 974-87 (1987);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 353-55
(1993). For an attempt at a construction of a different doet of constitutional hierarchy of values, see,
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHL L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 223 (1996).
144. Cf. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
145. See, e.g., Daniel Lazare, America the Undemocratic, 232 NEw LEFT REv. 3, 9-10 (1998); Cf J.M.
Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998).
146. And here I speak not of constitutional amendment in which we seek to add to the protections
afforded, but rather, to constitutional amendment which seeks to affect the rights already in place, and
particularly those in the Bill of Rights.
147. For a discussion of the national reluctance to indulge in significant formal Constitutional
revisionism, see, Gerald Benjamin and Tom Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L. &
POL'Y SYmpOsiuM 53 (1996).
148. For a discussion of the theory and utility of supra-national juridical organs and their effects on
national courts, see, Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273,325 (1997).
149. In several ways the Supreme Court is analogous to the European Court of Human Rights.
It often operates to bring States into line with minimum standards of human rights, and this
may take place despite fierce opposition at the local level thousand of miles away. Also,
both Courts may have to cope with the different substantive and procedural laws of the
various States over which the Court has jurisdiction. This produces a similar dilemma for
both Courts -whether to allow for local autonomy or concede to the demands for unity and
uniformity. Of course the differences are significant. There is no system of federal courts in
Europe, and the Council of Europe cannot be compared to the federal government of the
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European Convention contains protections for speech' 0 and association.' The
protections in the European Convention are articulated, within the black letter, as
oppositional rights. With respect to speech, the European Convention articulates
an absolute protection of speech, limited only by the European Convention's
protections for the right of the State to regulate in a variety of contexts, and
subject to various principals of action. With respect to association, the same form
of construction follows. On the one hand the individual is accorded absolute
rights. On the other hand, the state is accorded the power to interfere with those
rights in the context of specific situations and within the parameters of certain
principles.152  These limiting parameters on state interference in the context of
association rights are not identical to those set forth for speech rights.153 In both
cases, the interests of the individual in the preservation of his rights are balanced
against the interest of the state, also of constitutional magnitude, to interfere with
those rights.
The European Court of Human Right's jurisprudence, thus, is substantially
based on and limited to interpretation (what do the Convention's terms mean in a
particular context). Yet, equally important, interpretation requires the European
Court of Human Rights to balance the competing interests of the parties before it
in a wide variety of contexts. In the area of speech rights, the European Court of
ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 151-152 (1993).
150. Article 10 of the European Convention provides protection for speech.
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers ....
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and
morals, for the protection of reputation or rights of others, for preventing disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of thejudiciary.
For a general discussion of the cases decided under Article 10, see J.E.S. FAWCETr, THE APPLICATION
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 250-273 (1987); FRANCIS G. JACOBS AND
ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 223-245 (2d ed. 1996).
151. Article 11 of the European Convention sets out the basic protection for rights of association:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
with others ....
(2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or
of the administration of the state.
On the right of association, see, e.g., A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE:
A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 160-64 (3d ed., 1993); DONNA
GOMIEN, DAVID HARRIS & LEO ZWAAK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 304-07 (1996).
152. Art. 10(2) and Art. 11(2) of the European Convention specifies those conditions under which
some deviation from the fundamental right is permissible.
153. Compare Art. 10(2) with Art 11(2) of the European Convention. While the two provisions are
similar, they are not identical.
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Human Rights "seeks to balance the interests of the individual in paragraph (1)
with the interests of the State in paragraph (2)." 154 Moreover, the European Court
of Human Rights must also balance the relative value of fights guaranteed under
the European Convention, in cases where they may conflict. Thus, for example,
"the state may restrict the exercise of rights under Article 10 by invoking other
articles under the Convention and not just the second paragraph of the Article
itself."155 In this respect, the European Court of Human Rights, like the German
Federal Constitutional Court and the U.S. Supreme Court is faced with a set of
fundamental rights, neither absolute, nor subject to easy interpretation. 6
Yet, like the German court, the European Court of Human Rights has the
benefit of a black letter constitutional scheme in which the interests of the state
are clearly articulated. As a formal matter, there is little room for the European
Court of Human Rights to deviate from the list. The fly in the ointment, though, is
that the Court's power to interpret the black letter in particular contexts may
prove as effective a means of expansion (or contraction) within the context of the
European Court of Human Right's jurisprudence as a civil, rather than common-
law, court.
157
But the resulting balancing provides a substantial power over the objects of
balancing and the weight accorded to each - one of the principal problems
exemplified as decadent in the Southworth and Boy Scouts of America cases.
Thus, for example, the European Court of Human Rights' "margin of
appreciation" doctrine provides the European Court of Human Rights with a
discretion that may equal that of the Supreme Court in cases such as Southworth
and Boy Scouts of America.
A compression of the margin of appreciation and its ancillary
doctrines to one sentence would result in something resembling the
154. FRANCIS G. JACOBS AND ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
224 (2d ed. 1996).
155. See, e.g., DONNA GOMIEN, DAVID HARRIS & LEO ZWAAK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 277-80 (1996).
156. "The overwhelming majority of the case-law of the Court has related to the limitations on
freedom of expression contained in Article 10(2)." FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN WHITE, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 224 (2d ed. 1996).
157. The results can vary considerably from those reached by the courts in the United States. Thus,
for example, the European Court of Human Rights has determined that bar associations and architects'
associations may not be associations within the meaning of Article 11(1), functioning instead as public
bodies. See Revert and Legallais v. France, 8 Sept. 1989, App. 14331188 and 14332/88 (1989); 62 DR 309
(architects' association); A and Others v. Spain, 2 July 1990, App. 13750/88 (1990) 66 DR 188 (bar
association). As such, the freedoms of association for individuals do not apply. "Nor does the freedom
of association include the freedom not to join an association." FRANCIS G. JACOBS AND ROBIN
WHrrE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 241 (2d ed. 1996). Moreover, Article 11
may not protect an individual's rights within an organization, or an association's right to receive
governmental funding or standing to sue. For a discussion, see, e.g., DONNA GOMIEN, DAVID HARRIS
& LEO ZWAAK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 304-07 (1996). Likewise, with respect to Article 10, the Court has
reached results that might appear odd to Americans. For example, while the boundaries of freedom of
expression are great, the European Court of Human Rights has not brought within it the right to be
free of the consequences of speech. Kosiek v. Germany, 1986 Series A, No. 105 (1987) 9 EHRR 328
(an academic could be dismissed because of his extremist political party affiliation; employers were free
to consider party membership in review of the individual).
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following: The State enjoys a margin of appreciation to place a
restriction on the exercise of an individual right, but subject to
European supervision, in light of that restriction's necessity, and of
the legitimacy of its aim, and of the proportionality of the restriction
to that aim, with regard to the practice of other Convention States.158
Is there in these systems of human rights' protections a wisdom lacking in the
administration of federal constitutional rights in the United States? I would have
hoped so, but I think not. Each system exhibits the same interpretive tendency.
The difference, then, is not one of form, but of degree. And that difference can be
explained, in substantial part, by the form of the constitutional framework to
which each court must ultimately remain faithful. The Europeans have provided
their courts with a greater degree of guidance in making interpretive choices than
are found in the American federal constitution. The result is greater clarity with
respect to the tests and doctrines applicable in a given case than we have seen
possible in cases like Southworth and Boy Scouts of America. Yet, even with these
interpretive constraints, the courts have, in each instance, carved for themselves a
wide area of interpretive freedom. The case of the German Federal Constitutional
Court is instructive. 159  But there is a similar result within the interpretive
158. Eric Heinze, Principles for a Meta-Discourse of Liberal Rights: The Example of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 9 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 319,330 (1999). For a discussion of the
mechanics of determining consensus under the principle, see, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer, Consensus,
Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 133 (1993). Hilary
Charlesworth has noted that:
A review of the approximately two hundred cases of the European Court permits
the following generalizations. A wide margin of appreciation of judicial restraint is
applied in the following contexts: (1) the law deals with economic policies; (2) the
law is in transition; (3) the aim of the law is to protect public morals; (4) the subject
matter of the law is the design of electoral systems; or (5) great diversity of
approach currently exists among the contracting parties. On the other hand, a
narrow margin of appreciation of judicial activism is applied where (1) the
individual right is particularly important... ; (2) the infringement of the right is
great or the essence of the right is affected; (3) the aim of the law is the protection
of the authority of the judiciary; or (4) a great uniformity of approach exists among
the contracting parties.
Hilary Charlesworth et al., Resolving Conflicting Human Rights Standards in International Law 85 AM.
SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 336, 338 (1991). See generally, HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF
APPRECIATION DOcrRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 28
(1996). The doctrine has been criticized on a variety of grounds. Some commentators have noted that
the essence of the principle results in an inevitably arbitrary application of the principle. See Angela
Thompson, International Protection of Women's Rights: An Analysis of Open Door Counseling Ltd.
and Dublin Well Women Centre v. Ireland, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 371, 398 (1994); Natalie Klashtorny,
Ireland's Abortion Law: An Abuse of International Law, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 419, 441-42
(1996) (decrying the selective and arbitrary manipulation of the margin of appreciation to deny a state
the right to criminalize homosexual activity, but not to deny a state the right to prohibit abortion).
159. The Constitutional Court has been most creative in its interpretation. Indeed many of the
central concepts in German constitutional jurisprudence have no visible roots in the text or
legislative history of the Basic Law: proportionality, reciprocal effect, the impact of fundamental
rights on private conduct, the requirement of fidelity to the federal system. As in the United
States, there has been a tendency away from rules and towards a balancing of competing interests.
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jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.16° With the courts chosen
as mediators between government and individuals, with government as mediators
between conflicting social norms within society, it is unlikely that the problem of
interpretive specificity can be reduced. The courts will remain important, though
perhaps increasingly remote sources for guidance in the individual case.
Perhaps, ultimately, the French system comes closest to the democratic ideal
of constitutional protection - by vesting the protection within the primary source
of its abuse. It may well be that the democratic principle requires people to
protect themselves through political participation or exit the system. An
intermediary, like the courts, provides individual relief at the price of systemic
breakdown by the weight of its interpretive history. Judicial supremacy in
constitutional matters, essentially anti-democratic in a literal sense, robs the courts
of authority to a certain extent, increasing the likelihood that judicial
determinations will be ignored.161  To the extent constitutional norms serve
parochial interests, judicial constitutionalism acts to check the power of non-
dominant communities to participate in the crafting of a nation's basic legal
norms. 162  A system without intermediaries robs the individual of justice in a
particular case, but preserves, for good, but probably more for ill, the
consequences of democratic judgment exercised by the "genius" of a nation
speaking through its elected representatives. 6s
160. It has been noted, with respect to the European Court of Human Right's margin of appreciation
doctrine, that the "doctrine is a multifunctional tool in the hands of the Strasbourg authorities. As they
choose not to fix its identity in any permanent way, this quicksilver notion may take the guise of a
method of interpretation which the Court invokes at its discretion, and may even appear as a formal
standard or test which the Court obliges itself to address." HOWARD CHARLES YOUROw, THE
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE 195 (1996).
161. See MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (on the
legitimacy of the judicial control of constitutional interpretation); Frank Cross, Institutions and
Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1585 (2000).
162. Ran Hirschl suggests that:
Hence the process of judicial empowerment through the constitutionalization of rights may
accelerate when the hegemony of ruling elites in majoritarian decision making arenas is
threatened by "peripheral" groups. As such threats become severe, hegemonic elites who
possess disproportionate access to and influence upon the legal arena may initiate a
constitutional entrenchment of rights in order to transfer power to the courts. The process of
conscious judicial empowerment in relatively open, rule-of-law polities is likely to occur
when the judiciary's public reputation for political impartiality and rectitude is relatively
high, and when the courts are likely to rule, by and large, in accordance with the cultural
propensities of the hegemonic community. In other words, judicial empowerment through
the constitutional fortification of rights may provide an efficient institutional way for
hegemouic socio-political forces to preserve their hegemony and to secure their policy
preferences even when majoritarian decisionmaking processes are not operating to their
advantage.
Ran Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment Through
Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 73, 75 (2000).
163. It may be that parliamentary supremacy works best in nations with homogenous popuiations. In
states with non-homogenous populations, where hegemony is important to competing groups and
where relations between groups is acrimonious, parliamentary supremacy provides a vehicle for its own
distortion. South Africa during the Apartheid era provides a case in point. See JOHN DUGARD,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 14-36 (1978). Pluralism, itself, in
conjunction with the democratic principle and imperfect human beings, may serve as the best argument
2000]
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III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS -WHAT'S NExT
Charles Fried suggested that for the Supreme Court justices to inject the
methods of comparative constitutional law into their constitutional jurisprudence
would be remarkable indeed - though scholars engage in the practice as a matter
of routine. 164 Perhaps this ought to be turned on its head. The authority of the
courts is a delicate matter. This is all the more so when they are entrusted with the
interpretation of the basic understanding of a community's social and political
mores. Judicial authority is easily lost in that context as courts depart from the
limited role of confirming and maintaining the social consensus.165 Courts lose
more authority as they draft away from the text of the Constitution itself. 66 Yet it
seems that the weight of cultural authority continues moving towards the
juridification of basic questions of concern to social and political communities
worldwide. 67 The judge is here to stay. Judicial process, and the role of the courts
as the embodiment of the myth of fair politics through process will be the twenty-
first century's coping mechanism as the world's legal, economic and political
systems converge, one way or another.'( In that emerging milieu, insular judging,
parochial judging, uncontrolled judging, will prove dangerous to any judicial
system.
The act of comparing, judiciously applied, serves to remind us that any
system can become lost in its own detail or buried under the mass of its own
product. I have suggested that the American system of constitutional
interpretation, at least in the area of First Amendment speech and association
rights, is out of control. It has lost its moorings in the black letter and been tossed
in a sea of secondary interpretive doctrines which effectively drain the
constitutional protection of any meaning-save that attendant on the working out of
the secondary doctrine, and the molding of fact to suit the requirements of that
doctrine. Such doctrine is not contained within the limitations of black letter
interpretive guidance, as is possible to some extent, in the European Convention
of the need for juridification as the best, though imperfect, means of mediating between communities,
locked together within a polity, on the basis of the shared norms constituting the basis of their political
union. But judicial supremacy unchecked by the polity and formal basic law also provides the basis for
excess and its own distortion. The hyper nuance of American constitutionalism provides a case in
point. Hypernuance based on doctrine which drifts farther and farther from the legitimating
instrument granting judicial authority creates the basis for judicial irrelevance. In a pluralist political
system, irrelevance may lead us to an unhappy alternative - that of an underground culture of basic
norms, outwardly obedient to the rejected order and inwardly loyal to an alternative system. The
Soviet Union experienced this dual nature before its collapse.
164. Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 807, 816-
820 (2000). See George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
683, 691 (1998) (on the provincialism of American jurists in this respect).
165. See Larry Catd Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Interpretive
Conversations Between Courts and Culture, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291,305-14 (2000).
166. In this regard, cf, MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTs
(1982).
167. Cf W. JACKSON AND C.N. TATE, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1992), with A.R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW (1989).
168. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992) (judicially based
constitutionalism and worldwide democracy); James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National
High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 (1998).
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system. Neither is there a hierarchy of values provided (at least a generalized
interpretive container) as provided by the German Constitutional Court. Instead,
the American Supreme Court acts as its own gatekeeper and interpretive guide.
There is no effective legislative control or interpretive guide beyond the bare
language of the First Amendment itself. The result is the development of a
progression of interpretive norms that, like the sand on a beach, drift on the wind
of the whims and passions of a majority who occupy seats on the Court.'69 This is
not to impugn the character of intentions of any particular member of the
Supreme Court. But it suggests that despite the brilliance of the people who staff
the Court, systemic openness results in the transfer of constitutional power from
those with the political responsibility for setting its limits, to those with the mere
task of applying those limits to the particular facts before them. Greater
Constitutional black letter is desirable - it will not come in our day.170 Our portion
will be an increasingly complex and disjointed mountain of judging and the
reconstruction of our basic rights to suit the character of the judges of the day.
169. See JEFFEREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL
MODEL (1993) (landmark decisions reflecting the socio-political beliefs of the justices called to
participate in the decision).
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